Scottish Exceptionalism? Normative Codes of Scottish Nationalism in the British and EU Crises by Law, Alex
ScottiSh exceptionaliSm? normative codeS of ScottiSh 
nationaliSm in the BritiSh and eU criSeS
Alex Law, Abertay University
Abstract : Scotland has thus far proved immune to the appeal of  right-wing 
populism present in many European neoliberal democracies. This paper 
argues that changing tension balances in the crises facing the UK as a union 
state cannot be reduced to an understanding of  the supposedly internal 
challenge of  Scottish sub-state nationalism. Instead sub-state nationalism 
needs to be situated in the shifting long-term, inter-state power balances of  
Britain as a union state and a rising and falling world power. Such an approach 
builds on the promise offered by the historical sociology of  Norbert Elias 
to account for the over-functioning of  the normative humanist we-ideals of  
Scottish civic nationalism in the British and EU crises.




One of  the side-effects of  the UK referendum of  2016 on EU membership is 
that it accentuated the internal crisis of  the British state. Brexit presented rejuvenated 
sub-state nationalism in Scotland with another opportunity to threaten the territorial 
integrity of  the UK state. While England voted narrowly to leave the EU (53:47) 
Scotland voted even more emphatically to remain (62:38). This led to renewed claims 
about a progressive “civic”, largely social democratic nation being wrenched out of  
the EU against its will by nativist, right-wing English populism. Similar claims were 
voiced two years earlier during the 2014 referendum on an “independent” Scottish 
state that resulted in a narrow margin (55:45) to remain part of  the UK. The Scottish 
Independence referendum witnessed mass participation in sometimes acrimonious, 
emotionally-charged public debate and activity, culminating in the highest ever recorded 
vote (85 percent) in the UK since the advent of  universal suffrage. 
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With the break-up of  the union state narrowly avoided, Prime Minister David 
Cameron placed a reckless wager on the EU referendum, a gamble condemned as 
inept from the point of  view of  ruling elites attempting to negotiate deep-rooted 
power tensions of  a crisis-ridden UK state. Jessop (2017: 134) summarised the main 
contours of  the «organic crisis» afflicting the UK state as «a long-running split in the 
establishment, a worsening representational crisis in the party system, a growing crisis 
of  authority for political elites, a legitimacy crisis of  the state, and a crisis of  national-
popular hegemony over the population». 
In the context of  resurgent ethno-nationalism, protectionism and Brexit, Scotland 
might appear to be something of  an anomaly. Thus far it has proved immune to the 
appeal of  right-wing populism that has harnessed popular resentments and discontent 
elsewhere in the West. Instead, popular grievance against neoliberal austerity has 
been channelled by the well-worn parliamentary routines of  the governing Scottish 
National Party (SNP) and what is seen, problematically, as the unchallenged hegemony 
of  “civic nationalism” over ethnic nationalism. This paper argues that the “we-they” 
images of  the civic nation more or less successfully bracket out Scotland’s historical 
complicity in British power politics, imperialist violence and the humiliating trauma 
of  national decline. Politics in Scotland trade on deepening processes of  functional 
democratisation and more equal power chances for past outsider groups, principally 
women, Catholics and LGBT, and evince a relatively high level of  collective awareness 
and public stigma of  overt displays of  social superiority and offensive denigration of  
socially weaker groups.
Perhaps surprisingly from a post-national perspective, sub-state nationalism in 
Scotland is also enthusiastically European. Although it opposes an encroaching 
European super-state, the SNP advocates deeper integration at the level of  the 
European Union – under the oxymoronic slogan “Independence in Europe” - at the 
same time as seeking to dissolve the union state. It is necessary to examine critically 
the thesis of  apparent Scottish exceptionalism by situating normative appeals to civic 
humanism within a historical sociology of  the long-term, inter-state power balances 
of  as a rising and falling world power. Such an approach builds on the promise 
offered by the historical sociology of  Norbert Elias on state formation processes and 
national habitus. Putting the British state formation process in long-term perspective 
has the advantage of  clarifying the general trajectory of  increasingly large-scale social 
integration processes through what Elias described as «all the fissions and fusions, all 
the disintegration and integration spurts» (2008a: 111).
Scotland in the maelstrom
The presumed absence of  “pathological” or essentialist forms of  Scottish nationalism 
is typically explained in terms of  the survival since the founding of  the Union state 
in 1707 of  an autonomous, extra-state civil society, principally the institutions of  
religion, education and law, that somehow continuously characterise Scotland as an 
eminently charismatic “stateless nation” (McCrone 1992). National elites in Scotland 
commend civil society as largely immune to assertions of  in-group superiority and 
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outsider inferiority. This not only obscures processes described by Stephen Mennell 
(2007) as “functional de-democratisation” of  widening power differentials and more 
ambivalent We-I images within Scotland, it also evades the strategic contribution of  
Scots as soldiers, administrators and colonists to the British empire (Devine 2003). 
Historically, right wing populism in Scotland tended to be marginalised by the 
sectarian power chances of  Protestants as an established group resisting the weaker 
power bases of  outsider Irish Catholicism (Bowd 2013). Since the 1950s, however, 
secularisation, economic restructuring and democratisation processes have eroded the 
cohesion and controls of  the sectarian figuration and generated more equal power 
chances for Catholic outsiders (Law 2016). As the established Protestant group gradually 
lost its charismatic self-worth they, by and large, adjusted to reality without lapsing into 
collective fantasy images that often issue from the experience of  group trauma (Elias, 
Scotston 2008). While not without its tensions and conflicts, this process produced a 
relatively high level of  awareness of  the dissolution of  the special superiority of  the 
established Protestant group. Expressions of  sectarian superiority began to be felt by 
many as a badge of  shame rather than one of  privilege. Some attempted to emotionally 
escape the changed relations symbolically through the “controlled de-controlling” of  
sectarian fantasy images ritualistically enacted at public parades and football-related 
displays. In 2012 the nationalist government made the display of  sectarian symbols at 
football games a criminal offence as part of  a top-down “civilising offensive” (Flint, 
Powell 2013).
At stake here is what Elias (2013: 169) identified as the «duality of  normative codes 
within the nation-state»: on the one hand, a humanist code that elevates the inherent 
equality of  individuals as the highest human value and, on the other hand, a great 
power code that asserts the exclusive rights of  the nation-state as the highest human 
ideal. The duality of  normative codes is mediated by an argumentative repertoire that 
Michael Billig (1998: 87-8) terms «double-declaiming». Double-declaiming refers to an 
ambivalent repertoire of  in-group rhetoric where justifications and we-ideals, premises 
and conclusions, explanans and explanandum, constantly change places to simultaneously 
support and deny unequal relations of  group superiority and self-praise while, at the 
same time, appearing to affirm the more equal relations of  functional democratisation 
(Billig 1998). 
Within nations rhetorical strategies of  double-declaiming allow people to lend a 
specific but shifting gravity to one side or the other of  the dual normative code in 
the ordinary course of  arguing and thinking with others. In Scotland, the praise code 
denies that it is a praise code by decentring the emotional we-ideals of  group superiority 
the better to articulate them on a more rational, civic and humanist basis. Even the 
word “nationalism” has been rejected by the leader of  the nationalist government in 
Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon. In a debate with Turkish author Elif  Şafak, whose 2006 
novel The Bastard of  Istanbul was condemned by nationalists for «insulting Turkishness» 
(BBC 2017), Sturgeon rejected the ethnocentric connotations of  the term that it has 
«in other parts of  the world» (not here) and would remove the word from the name of  
her party if  that were possible (which it isn’t). Anyone who feels Scottish regardless of  
their origin, the First Minister claimed, has «as much say over the future of  the country 
as I do». Here, somewhat improbably, the egalitarian humanist code is advanced and 
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the ethnocentric code denied. While the word is overtly disclaimed, Sturgeon hesitated 
before articulating her defence of  civic nationalism: «So the word is hugely, hugely 
problematic sometimes for those of  us who [...] but Scottish independence is about 
self-government, it’s about running your own affairs and making your own mark in the 
world». 
Now, the thing to be justified (the explanandum), an independent state, itself  
becomes the justification (the explanans). An independent state is necessary because 
civic nationalism demands an independent state in a world of  other such states. 
Double-declaiming rescues the circular belief  in civic nationalism by decentring 
emotional nationalist pride while rationally re-centring the state to restore national 
pride – “running our own affairs”, “making our own mark” - that a moment before 
had been disclaimed. Such a decentred denial of  the emotional appeal of  collective 
superiority limits the scope for overtly ethnocentric discourse, even as the praise code 
is reintroduced by rational appeals to human universals. The decentred people of  the 
civic nation incline strongly towards humanist evaluations and only weakly towards the 
open glorification of  the state as an exclusive ideal. 
In England, the we-ideal is personified at the apex of  the state by the monarchy 
as “the minority of  the best” par excellence. Yet even the monarchy as a state-led 
“we-ideal” is beset by ambivalences and rationalisations that respond to Britain’s 
declining power chances in the world. In his study of  the rhetorical psychology of  
the monarchy, Billig (1998) found that ordinary speakers in England routinely double-
declaim to justify their own sense of  group superiority as the envy of  the outside world, 
especially America, the most powerful state-society, while at the same time denying 
any feelings of  collective superiority and pride. Ideal national we-images are projected 
onto outsider nations observing the majesty and mystery of  the monarchy, thereby 
enhancing the self-awareness of  the nation’s unique collective and personal charisma. 
Paradoxically, without a secure image of  unearned privilege (monarchy) the nation of  
equals (England) would cease to be the same nation in the eyes of  both its subjects and 
the world of  other nations. 
Every crisis and conflict affecting Britain as a state-society, such as Scottish 
independence or Brexit, is therefore also a division about how to respond by mediating 
the normative codes from a definite position within the historically-formed national 
habitus. As groups are integrated into increasingly complex and dense figurations, 
national forms of  integration continue to exert a more intensely affective commitment 
than post-national forms of  integration, such as the European Union or global 
humanity. A personalised tension-balance is formed through emotional involvement 
in the we-group of  the nation. National we-identity serves as a graphic example of  the 
degree to which the social habitus of  the individual provides a soil in which personal, 
individual differences can flourish. «The individuality of  the particular Englishman, 
Dutchman, Swede or German represents, in a sense, the personal elaboration of  a 
common social, and in this case national, habitus» (Elias 2008b: 210). And, we might 
add, from within the union state a distinctively Scottish national habitus developed with 
its own personal and collective gratifications and emotional consolations.
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What Billig (1995) also termed “banal nationalism” is founded on the “we-ideal” of  
group charisma, the unquestioned, tacit and relatively stable conventions of  how to talk, 
behave and feel formed by the national habitus. Group charisma and group disgrace 
are not fixed for eternity at the extreme poles of  the normative duality. Feelings of  
group disgrace over a violent imperialist past may be soothed by the double-declaiming 
argumentation of  present day charisma granted by the moral superiority of  rational-
national genius (Scottish intellectuals, inventors and scientists) and the humanist 
discourse of  civic, media and political elites. The fact that support for the monarchy 
is considerably lower and opposition higher in Scotland than England reinforces 
official we-images of  the moral and cognitive superiority of  Scotland as an especially 
egalitarian country.
As the state’s population became increasingly integrated and interdependent it was 
no longer possible for elite rule to take the absolute form of  dynastic states. Dynastic 
states founded on more or less exclusive elite authority were transformed into national 
state–societies characterised by political parties as mass institutions. 
The reciprocity of  the dependence of  government on those they govern and 
of  the governed on governments, though still uneven enough, has become less 
uneven than it used to be. The balance of  parties in different countries is a fairly 
exact indicator of  this balance of  power and its fluctuations. (Elias 2008a: 116)
The changing power balance is evident in the contrasting fortunes of  political 
parties. In the twenty-first century, the fortunes of  the SNP, the party of  sub-state 
nationalism whose central claim is that state territorial boundaries ought to correspond 
to the imagined boundaries of  nation, have waxed in Scotland in an unprecedented 
fashion. Over the past decade, a sustained upsurge in popular support for sub-state 
nationalism in Scotland led to the electoral eclipse of  the Labour Party, the dominant 
political institution in Scotland since the 1960s. 
Much of  the case for civic nationalism in Scotland rests on claims about the cohesive 
role and civilising function of  the post-war welfare state (Paterson 1994). Increasingly 
it appeared that only sub-state nationalism could defend distinctively “Scottish values” 
of  welfare, equality and humanity. Such claims both inflate the integrative role of  the 
welfare state and obscures the role of  the retreat from empire in the emergence of  
sub-state nationalism. Only with the twilight of  decolonisation processes did sub-state 
nationalism in Scotland begin to appear as a credible response to the inner tensions 
of  British decline. Until the mid-1960s Scottish business, labour, media, colonists 
and churches remained tenaciously committed to the lure of  empire (Glass 2014). 
Decolonisation enabled nationalism in Scotland to adopt a humanistic, civic post-
imperial we-image and progressively abandon Anglophobic ethnocentrism. From 
being a marginal political group for most of  the twentieth-century, the dominance of  
the SNP in post-imperial Scotland stands, as Glass (2014: 164) argues, as «a legacy of  
the failed empire».
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Historical sociology and imperial decline
While an earlier figurational flow is a necessary precondition for a later one to 
emerge, the later figuration is not the inevitable or necessary outcome of  the earlier 
one, which may develop or not develop in a range of  different possible ways (Elias 
2006). History has two main directions for Elias, tending over many generations 
either towards greater or lesser social integration and differentiation, thus rejecting the 
false choice between the Scylla of  static structures or the Charybdis of  unpatterned 
contingencies (Elias 2012). So, while a state-society figuration like Britain may exhibit 
a long-term tendency to form a larger, more centralised unit, it is also possible that 
power tensions and power chances not fully under the control of  people enmeshed in 
the figurational flow may also result in a series of  smaller, more fragmented units. Such 
has been the tendency of  the figurational flow in Scotland, itself  premised on the long-
term flow of  UK state-society as marked by relative decline in its global power chances.
Liberal humanism, the British civilising mission of  “the white man’s burden”, 
formed part of  the ideological justification of  group charisma for illiberal violence and 
colonial conquest. Imperial neoliberalism continues to be justified, as in the past, by a 
civilising mission that relegates the violence of  the imperial state behind the benevolent 
imposition of  trade, good governance and the rule of  law. In order to bolster elite 
confidence in the imperial project selective forgetfulness about the trauma of  past 
injustices are necessary. The foremost celebrant of  imperial neoliberalism today is 
the historian Niall Ferguson (2003) who, in a series of  best-selling books and media 
appearances, urges state elites to simply hold their nerve against whining critics, to 
refuse to succumb to a “crisis of  confidence” that empire is anything but a good thing 
in general that bestowed the beneficence of  liberal imperialism across the past five 
hundred years of  British and now American world empires. 
For Ferguson, unlike Elias, history evinces no long-term pattern or trajectory. Like 
the financial markets that he takes as his model, the historical process is infinitely 
complicated, spontaneous and chaotic, although it is also somehow constant and 
continuous (Morefield 2014). His concept of  time is locked into the contingencies of  
an imperfectly understood dynamic present, where at any moment an unanticipated 
crisis may erupt to abruptly plunge empires to their doom, an extreme version of  
short-term horizons, unusual for historians, that Elias (2009) called “presentism”. 
History as a permanent contingency is far removed from the process theory of  
Elias as a historically-derived symbolic means of  orientation. Elias refused to entertain 
the idea that this was the best of  all possible worlds, that existing society expresses the 
highest human ideals. For much sociology of  the past century long-term processes 
have become less relevant, at least in part because the ideals of  a new social order of  
nineteenth century forerunners Comte, Spencer and Marx conflict with the immediate, 
short-term demands of  the present. Earlier sociologists forefronted an «immanent 
order of  change» in variable and unplanned processes by which less complex and less 
differentiated relations become more complex and differentiated (Elias 2006: 145). 
Neither is the sophistication of  Elias’s figurational model captured by unilnear 
models of  state decline. Post-war state elites were routinely charged with a crisis of  
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confidence and nostalgic longings for imperial grandeur and a refusal to face a changed 
reality soberly. Realist discourses of  decline have a long pedigree in Britain. In 1776, 
at the end of  the Wealth of  Nations, Adam Smith (1776) appealed for greater realism in 
the economic benefits and costs of  defending the colonies in America and against the 
fantasy images of  empire entertained by the ruling elites.
The rulers of  Great Britain have, for more than a century past, amused the people 
with the imagination that they possessed a great empire on the west side of  the 
Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto existed in imagination only. It has 
hitherto been, not an empire, but the project of  an empire; not a gold mine, but 
the project of  a gold mine ... If  any of  the provinces of  the British empire cannot 
be made to contribute towards the support of  the whole empire, it is surely 
time that Great Britain should free herself  from the expense of  defending those 
provinces in time of  war, and of  supporting any part of  their civil or military 
establishments in time of  peace, and endeavour to accommodate her future views 
and designs to the real mediocrity of  her circumstances (Smith 1776: 944-7)
Neoliberal imperialists like Ferguson would view Smith’s call for a process of  
adaptation to “the real mediocrity” of  British state power as closer to a failure of  
ambition than a realistic policy of  imperial expansion. 
The phlegmatic British national habitus underwent a further crisis of  adaptation 
associated with precipitous national decline. Much of  the critique of  national decline, 
ranging from Marxists, neoliberals to conservatives, explained Britain’s apparently 
intractable crisis from the early 1960s until the 1990s as a consequence of  an amateurish, 
arcadian, moral-humanist elite culture that eschewed modern business, management, 
scientific and technological cultures (Anderson 1992; Gamble 1994). Where state elites 
promoted technological infrastructure, critics claimed that this was disproportionately 
tied to military expenditure in a vainglorious pursuit of  global power politics and 
squeezed out the developmental and entrepreneurial roles of  the state (Barnett 1986). 
Malaise, crisis and decline discourses framed neoliberalism as the solution to restore 
the British state-society to its rightful hegemonic place in the world (Overbeek 1990). 
In her critique of  the consensus of  the corporatist establishment, Margaret Thatcher 
acknowledged the influential, and highly debatable, account of  UK decline proposed 
by historian Corelli Barnett (1986). Thatcher claimed that a spurt of  competitive 
individualism and a global geo-political role for the UK state would revive British national 
charisma. In the afterglow of  (a rather fortunate) British victory in the Falklands/
Malvinas war Thatcher extolled the superiority strain of  Churchillian nationalism:
There were those who thought we could no longer do the great things which 
we once did. Those who believed that our decline was irreversible – that we 
could never again be what we were … that Britain was no longer the nation that 
had built an Empire and ruled a quarter of  the world. Well, they were wrong. 
The lesson of  the Falklands is that Britain has not changed and that this nation 
still has those sterling qualities which shine through our history. (Thatcher, in 
Barnett, 2012: 149-50)
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In the face of  global functional de-democratisation processes, Thatcher’s 
compensating fantasy we-images combined the humanist code of  market individualism 
and the nationalist power code of  “the strong state” (Gamble 1988).
That the decades-old discourse of  decline disappeared rather abruptly in the mid-
1990s indicates that it no longer needed to fulfil the function of  “modernising” the 
neoliberal state (Gamble 1994). This was not simply due to the explanatory inadequacies 
of  decline discourses. Rather it had more to do with a feeling at large among elites 
that Britain had been or was in the process of  being transformed, “modernised” and 
“renewed”, as New Labour relentlessly put it (Fairclough 2000). National charisma 
promoted by New Labour’s youthful, multicultural and vibrant “cool Britannia” no 
longer needed to be tempered by the archaic, post-imperial collective shame of  national 
decline, when Britain was described as “the sick man of  Europe”.
Normative codes and UK state-society
Like most of  his (and some of  our) contemporaries, Elias underestimated the 
painful and violent transition process as state elites experienced declining British 
geo-political and economic power, decolonisation, nationalist movements, and anti-
imperial sentiment. In the context of  Nazi barbarism, British crises like Suez appeared 
to Elias as “small lapses” in crises of  adaptation. As is well known, Elias (2013: 273) 
compared the different reactions to national decline in Germany and Britain. In 
Germany the failure to surrender fantasy images of  the nation as a great power in 
the world resulted in fascist barbarism. In Britain the shock of  decline was absorbed 
gradually without the same paroxysms of  rage and shame, “making a last stand by 
using violence”. In one case an attempt was made to make reality fit the we-ideal; in 
the other the we-ideal adapted to reality, however painful a process. Yet even if  he did 
not elaborate a satisfactory account of  the union state Elias (2008b) was well aware 
of  some of  the anomolies and peculiarities of  Britian as a state-society. In the 1950s 
it was understandable if  the distinction between England and Great Britain was not 
readily apparent to outsiders given the numerical preponderance of  England over other 
UK nations, and the concentration of  population in Greater London over the rest of  
England. Nonetheless, Elias is far too sanguine about the we-ideals of  British statecraft. 
A century ago the “break-up” of  the British state was announced with the opening 
salvos of  the 1916 rising in Dublin (Allen 2016). In 1926 the Balfour Declaration 
recognised the constitutional autonomy of  the predominantly “white” “British 
Dominions” within the British empire, initially Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, Newfoundland and the Irish Free State, as a loosely-affiliated “commonwealth 
of  nations”. This process of  shrinking UK statehood continued after the 1939-1945 
war with the forced retreat of  the British state from its worldwide empire. In 1981 
the UK state attempted to salvage the remnants of  empire by fighting a war with the 
Argentine state for possession of  a remote island outpost, Falklands/Malvinas, in the 
South Atlantic (Barnett 2012).  
Retreat from empire gave rise to the charismatic group myth of  an orderly, peaceful 
British withdrawal process that avoided the catastrophic escalation of  violence of  
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the French in Algeria or the US in Vietnam. It was often claimed that unlike other 
global powers Britain adopted a pragmatic humanist doctrine to isolate communist 
and nationalist non-state insurgents from civilian communities by winning “hearts and 
minds” to universal British values of  decency, restraint and forbearance combined, 
only when necessary, with the more conventional “kinetic” power of  military force 
(Briant 2015; Mumford 2012). Recent scholarship has amply demonstrated that British 
decolonisation was paved with torture, repression and atrocities committed against 
anti-colonial movements and civilians, from the Malayan Emergency (1948-60), the 
Kenyan Emergency (1952-60), the Aden Emergency (1962-67), to the Northern 
Ireland “Troubles” (1969-98) (Bennett 2013; Newsinger 2015). More recently, the 
southern Iraq debacle (2003-09) and Helmand, Afghanistan (2006-14) exposed the 
national myth of  British moral superiority in “minimum force” counter-insurgency 
acquired over six decades of  asymmetrical warfare (Briant 2015). 
In responding to individual emergencies, the retreat from empire was predicated 
by politicians and civil servants on the basis of  how best to serve the interests of  the 
UK state. State elites were in competition with each other to establish adequate policy 
responses. A new power balance began to emerge through such intra-governmental 
conflict between the defence and “overseas” ministries and the Treasury (Christie 
2004). By the 1960s closer cooperation with Europe, long thought anathema to British 
state power politics, began to supplant the falling economic value of  empire and the 
Commonwealth. 
Elias (2008b: 221-3) claims that three structural determinants shaped the British 
national habitus. First, Britain experienced a continuous development of  state and 
society, uninterrupted for centuries by foreign invasion, conquest and occupation. 
Second, a high level of  urbanisation in Britain concentrated large populations in a 
limited space, making social interdependency a more keenly felt daily experience. Third, 
the early absence of  a peasantry in Britain, with its isolated, separate forms of  life, 
removed a further barrier to the standardisation of  the social habitus. A distinctively 
British national habitus was not easily disturbed, indeed it was deepened, by war and 
de-colonialisation processes of  the twentieth century. One expression of  a secure 
national habitus was that British public opinion in the 1960s was largely indifferent to 
closer economic and political union with continental Europe (Elias 2008a).
Parliamentary rule founded on the sportisation of  political conflict gave rise to a 
relatively stable anglo-British national habitus (Elias, Dunning 2008). Elias (2008b: 226) 
developed a dynamic model of  the British state-society as «a field of  forces holding 
each other in equilibrium». Public opinion in post-war Britain was formed, according 
to Elias (2008b: 227), by spectators impassively watching the public stage of  political 
events but ever ready to actively make themselves heard: «public opinion is not simply 
a consensus of  opinion of  many people on a particular question of  the day, but 
something constantly in the process of  formation, a living process which advances by 
swings of  the pendulum and, in the course of  these swings, influences decisions made 
in the name of  the nation». A largely incohate body of  spectators may on occasion 
be aroused by a contentious issue that contravenes deeply embedded moral rules and 
«drive those acting on the political stage from the scene». 
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Elias gave the example of  the Suez crisis of  1956 when British public opinion was 
deeply divided about the world standing of  a once powerful state-society in decline. 
In the moral outrage expressed by British public opinion over the government’s 
aggression during the Suez crisis, Elias (2008c: 247) detected an affront to the humanist 
self-images that people entertain of  their own nation’s standing in the world. Changes 
in the power balance between the UK state and the new bi-polar state system reciprocally 
affected that between the rulers and ruled within the state-society. Suez represented 
a serious crisis of  adaptation for the UK state to the twin pressures of  functional 
democratisation and the geo-political decline of  a world power. By and large, Elias 
claims, the British ruling class gradually came to terms with the trauma of  treating 
nations and classes formerly perceived as subordinate and inferior as more equal in 
human value. Pragmatic adaptation to new realities and the tempering of  unfettered 
competition in power politics, as in sport and daily life was, Elias thought, a reflex 
deeply ingrained in the British national habitus.  
Alongside the Suez crisis, Elias (2008b: 223-7) gave the long forgotten case of  John 
Waters as a mundane example of  the late 1950s British “we-ideal” in operation. Waters, 
a “cheeky” 15 year-old Scottish schoolboy, was assaulted by a police officer after using 
“foul language”. His father complained to the police about the police assault which the 
Crown Office decided not to pursue. The case was taken up by the national press and 
was raised in Parliament by the local MP who demanded a criminal prosecution. Instead 
a Tribunal of  Inquiry was appointed to establish that the legal procedure was properly 
observed and, crucially, to soothe an aroused British “public opinion”. In post-war 
Britain, public opinion double-declaimed pragmatically without lapsing dogmatically to 
extremes, in this case first supporting a public inquiry, while later questioning its value 
as an excessive response to a relatively minor matter.
The moral weight of  the humanist code
The universe described by Elias of  a seamless and shared British “we-ideal” no 
longer corresponds to the national habitus in Scotland. Social attitude surveys show 
that Scots identify less and less as British and more and more as Scottish (see Table 1). 
In forced choice surveys around 60 percent of  Scots identify as exclusively or more 
Scottish than British, up to one third identify as equally Scottish and British, while only 
a very small number identify as mainly British.
A diverging politics in Scotland cannot be explained by a different socio-economic 
structure or different moral values. Like other post-industrial wastelands Scotland 
experienced an acute process of  functional de-democratisation with the collapse of  
manufacturing employment in the 1980s. It experiences some of  the worst and rising 
levels of  poverty, income and health inequalities in Europe (Scottish Government, 
2017). Males in Scotland have one of  the lowest life expectancies in Western Europe, 
with the highest levels of  morbidity concentrated in the post-industrial urban centres 
(Walsh et alii 2010). Such indices of  functional de-democratisation are typically thought 
to provide fertile breeding ground for the retaliation of  angry populism associated with 
groups “left behind” by neoliberal cosmopolitanism.
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Given broad structural and attitudinal similarities, the absence of  a populist backlash 
movement in Scotland is typically explained by an appeal to the political realism of  
a small nation. Sub-state nationalism in Scotland, it is claimed, is inoculated against 
overblown rhetoric about outsiders or nostalgic hankerings for the re-industrialisation 
and re-masculinisation of  labour power. As one authoritative commentator has argued, 
Scotland is a highly integrated, small nation led by a social liberal elite that provides 
civic nationalism with a “relatively benign” and outward looking character:
Scotland is fortunate in having a form of  relatively benign identity politics in the 
shape of  Scottish nationalism. Patriotism isn’t necessarily a bad thing provided 
it is attached to higher ideals than narrow self-interest. Small countries have to 
have modest ambitions and no-one talks of  making “Scotland Great Again”... 
The lesson from Scotland is surely that, with enlightened political leadership, it 
is not inevitable that economic grievance should express itself  as working-class 
revolt against social liberalism. (Macwhirter 2016: 37)
From such perspectives, deepening processes of  functional democratisation 
defuse the resentments of  functional de-democratisation processes. Appeals are made 
routinely to a long tradition of  egalitarian humanism in Scotland, encapsulated by 
Robert Burns’ poem A Man’s a Man for a’ That of  1795, sung at the official opening 
ceremony of  the Scottish parliament in 1999 but also sung by socialist politicians to 
protest at the Scottish parliament’s oath of  allegiance to the Queen:
Table 1: Scottish and British national identity, 1997 - 2014 (percent)
1997 1999 2000 2001 2003 2007 2009 2011 2014
Scottish not
British
23 32 37 36 31 27 27 31 27
More Scottish
than British
38 35 31 30 34 30 31 34 32
Equally Scottish and
British
27 22 21 24 22 28 26 24 35
More British
than Scottish
4 3 3 3 4 5 4 4 3
British not
Scottish
4 4 4 3 4 6 4 3 2
Sources: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, in McCrone and Bechoffer, 2015: 132; McCrone, 2017: 454
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Gie fools their silks, 
and knaves their wine;
A Man’s a Man for a’ that ... 
The honest man, tho’ e’er sae poor,
Is king o’ men for a’ that.
Ye see yon birkie ca’d a lord,
Wha struts, an’ stares, an’ a’ that,
Tho’ hundreds worship at his word,
He’s but a coof  for a’ that.
For a’ that, an’ a’ that,
His ribband, star, an’ a’ that,
The man o’ independent mind,
He looks an’ laughs at a’ that...
It’s comin yet for a’ that,
That Man to Man the warld o’er
Shall brithers be for a’ that.
By the twenty-first century more equal power chances in Scotland were not limited 
to men, illustrated by the fact that all the leaders of  the main political parties and the 
First Minister in Scotland are women while two party leaders publicly identify as LGBT. 
Similarly, the Scottish government appeals to the Eurocentric we-ideals of  civic 
nationalism in contrast to the Eurosceptic antagonism of  British state nationalism. 
Following the Brexit vote the official position of  the Scottish government was outlined 
in a statement intended for an international readership: Scotland: A European Nation. 
This emphasised that Scotland’s national history has been closely intertwined with 
European power politics, cultural flows and migration patterns: «Scotland has always 
had strong ties with Europe both as an independent nation until 1707 and as part of  
the United Kingdom thereafter» (Scottish Government 2016: 7). The nationalist claim 
is repeated here that Scotland existed as an ancient European nation long before the 
eighteenth century (Ichijo 2004). In the official government text this is charted from 
the introduction of  Christianity to Scotland in the 6th century, the “Auld Alliance” 
with France of  the 13th century, intellectual, military and trading exchanges across 
feudal Europe, the Scottish enlightenment as part of  a wider European movement, the 
birth of  literary romanticism in the nineteenth century, through to the more prosaic 
present day realities of  Erasmus student exchange programme, cultural festivals, and 
transnational flows in capital and labour. 
All nations balance between the collective hubris of  nationalism and the universal 
moral codes of  humanism. An underlying humanism of  official civic nationalism 
affirms the moral virtue of  greater human integration while preserving national 
distinctiveness. Nations not only face inwards but also outwards where their standing 
in the eyes of  other nations matters a great deal to the collective sense of  self-worth. As 
the Scottish government argues: «Scotland is a European nation grounded in the desire 
62
Cambio. Rivista sulle trasformazioni sociali, VII, 13, 2017
Alex Law
for peace and justice, firm in its cultural, environmental, social and economic ambition, 
and inspired by a generous vision of  our obligations to fellow human beings and to 
the world» (Scottish Government 2016: 18). Moreover, the document concludes with a 
list of  Scotland’s unique achievements in education, science and technology (including 
inventions and discoveries of  the steam engine, fridge, telephone, television, pneumatic 
tyre, penicillin, bicycle, mammal cloning, the Higgs Boson particle), an official reminder 
to the Scottish nation of  its own special group charisma (Elias, Scotston 2008).
Scotland in the balance
In Scotland, official forms of  double-declaiming continue to subordinate codes of  
declining UK state power as magical thinking under routine appeals to the democratic 
and humanist codes of  collective self-praise. In the duality of  the normative codes 
of  civic nationalism humanist codes greatly outweigh coercive state power codes, 
limiting the opportunities for overt displays of  ethnocentric superiority in Scotland 
beyond the sectarian margins. Yet it is important to stress that until the twenty-first 
century the established nationalism of  the union state commanded wide if  declining 
hegemony in Scotland. Indeed, British state nationalists supported devolution in the 
1998 referendum with the expectation that it would act as a permanent barrier to the 
formation an independent Scottish state.
With the loss of  empire, opportunities for personal advancement were reduced 
for ambitious Scots. What was once an avowed source of  Anglo-Scottish we-group 
pride became increasingly perceived by Scots as one of  British out-group shame. Once 
the British crisis of  confidence was symbolically abolished by Blair the demands of  
sub-state nationalism in Scotland began to be addressed. Until then, the union state 
had more or less successfully managed the internal tensions of  Scottish nationalism, 
which oscillated between appealing to formal rights as an equal partner in the Union 
and the substantive injustices of  a dominated nation in an unequal Union that was not 
freely chosen. In each case, an ideal we-image of  the Scottish nation and its institutions 
has been repeatedly mobilised to demand either a reformed Union or its abolition. 
For sub-state nationalists the union state always appears Janus-faced: it needs either 
strengthened or eliminated. It can never take a final, settled form.
Only when the power balance represented by sub-state devolution inevitably failed 
to satisfy renewed demands for social reform was the question of  an “independent” 
Scottish state posed in a zero-sum way. Like the EU Leave slogan that urged voters 
to “take back control”, the Scottish National Party (Scottish Government 2013: 1) 
made the case for an “independent” state with the claim that «Scotland’s future will 
be in Scotland’s hands». Sub-state formation processes in Scotland were subject to 
a further developmental spurt in 2016 with the UK referendum on membership of  
the European Union. A further referendum to establish an independent Scottish state 
has been postponed as the Brexit disorder presents ever new grounds for nationalist 
grievance, a process that will add further fuel to an already blazing firestorm engulfing 
the UK state.
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